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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a negligence case which stems from the fire destruction of certain leased property.
Appellant Tech Landing, LLC, leased a structure to Respondent JLH Ventures, LLC, whereon
Respondent operated a paintball business. Appellant contends that Respondent negligently caused
the fire which destroyed the property by negligent installation and maintenance of a clothes dryer
on the property. It is Appellant's contention on appeal that the District Court abused its discretion
in excluding testimony from Appellant's two expert witnesses regarding causation in opposition
to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, Appellant contends on appeal that
the District Court erred in granting summary judgment and concluding that no rational juror could
conclude that Respondent's negligence caused the fire.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Please see Appellant's opening brief for a thorough description of the facts and the course
of proceedings in this matter.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in excluding testimony from Appellant's
two expert witnesses regarding causation in opposition to Respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment?

II.

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment and concluding that no
rational juror could conclude that Respondent's negligence caused the fire?

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN EXCLUDING
TESTIONY FROM APPELLANT'S TWO EXPERT WITNESSES REGARDING
CAUSATION IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
A.

Appellant appropriately set forth the applicable standard of review in its
opening brief and described in detail how the District Court abused its
discretion.

Respondent argues that Appellant waived any argument that the District Court abused its
discretion because its briefing lacked any discussion concerning the legal standard required to
establish an abuse of discretion.

Respondent' Brief, pp. 7-8.

Respondent's cite to State v.

Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569,388 P.3d 583 (2017), a criminal case concerning the application ofl.R.E.
404(a) and "prior bad act evidence," in support of their argument. Id. Respondent further argues
that Appellant did not explain how the District Court's rulings would be considered an abuse of
the court's discretion. Id. Respondent's argument is perplexing.
Appellant appropriately set forth the applicable standard of review in its opening brief at
pages 12-13. Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13. As set forth previously, the admissibility of expert
testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment "is a threshold matter that
is distinct from whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude
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summary judgment." Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 173, 335 P.3d 14, 18 (2014), quoting
Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012). A district court has

broad discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert. Weeks v. Eastern
Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834 at 837, 153 P.2d at 1183. Admissibility of expert testimony

is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse
of that discretion. Id. When reviewing an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, the Idaho
Supreme Court considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
whether the trial court reached its decision by the exercise of discretion. Id.
Appellant described in detail throughout its opening brief how the District Court abused its
discretion by failing to recognize and apply the appropriate test or law. This failure by the District
Court goes to all three of the factors considered, most obviously the second and third factors
respectively.
Appellant's opening brief set forth the test for admissibility of expert testimony, which is
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. It then set forth this Court's interpretation
of the Rule that the focus of a court's inquiry is to be on the expert's "principles and methodology,"
not the conclusions they generate. Id., at pp. 13-14. Appellant than argues throughout the opening
brief that the District Court failed to examine the scientific methodologies utilized by Appellant's
experts, but instead required specific testimony regarding the fire ignition sequence and weighed
its own scientific understanding against the conclusions of Appellant's expert witness.
Specifically, Appellant argued that the District Court's decision to exclude Mr. Hunt's testimony
is an abuse of its discretion as it inappropriately parsed the language of Mr. Hunt's report, failed
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to recogmze the scientific methodology utilized in reaching hi opm10n on causation,
inappropriately required testimony regarding the ignition of the fire and inappropriately substituted
its own judgment over that of a highly qualified expert in the field of fire scient. Id., at pp. 14-20.
Appellant then argued that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to recognize the
methodology employed by Mr. Cutbirth and by inappropriately substituting its own judgment over
that of a qualified expert. Id., at pp. 21-24. Appellant's opening brief sets forth specifically how
the District Court's rulings are to be considered an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, there has
been no waiver. Instead, Appellant's argument is appropriate and structurally similar to this
Court's discussions in Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc., 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180
(2007); Nield v. Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 14, (2012); andLantham
v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 492-93, 943 P.2d 912, 918-919 (1997).

B.

The District Court inappropriately excluded Dean Hunt's expert testimony
on causation as it failed to recognize the scientific methodology utilized in
reaching the opinion and inappropriately required specific testimony
regarding the ignition sequence.

Respondent argues that the District Court correctly excluded Mr. Hunt's expert testimony
on causation. Respondent contends that "the only opinion [Mr. Hunt] offered 'with a reasonable
degree of fire science certainty' was limited to determining in which room the fire started. He did
not offer a similar opinion regarding the cause of the fire." Respondent's Brief, p. 13. Respondent
argues that Mr. Hunt's statement that the probable cause of the fire was the dryer was not based
on specialized knowledge but was simply a "logical deduction" based on the dryer being in the
room where Hunt believed the fire started.

Id., p. 12.

However, as set forth in Appellant's

opening brief, the District Court's decision to exclude Mr. Hunt's testimony is an abuse of its
discretion as it inappropriately parsed the language of Mr. Hunt's report, failed to recognize the

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 7

scientific methodology utilized in reaching both opinions, inappropriately required testimony
regarding the ignition of the fire and inappropriately substituted its own judgment over that of a
highly qualified expert in the field of fire science.
As previously noted, Mr. Hunt provided the following conclusion in this report:
This fire originated in the laundry room located in the northeast comer of
the structure. This determination was based on the observed patterns of fire
damage, witness statements, and a systemic evaluation of the remaining
physical evidence and within a reasonable degree of fire science certainty.
The probable cause of this fire is the dryer in the laundry room that had been
left running prior to the fire. The cause of this fire in undetermined pending
an evaluation by an electrical engineer.
R., p. 814.
Contrary to Respondent's contention, Mr. Hunt's report provides two expert opinions: (1)
the fire originated in the laundry room; and (2) the probable cause of the fire is the dryer in the
laundry room that had been left running prior to the fire. R., p. 814. Per Mr. Hunt's report, both
of these opinions are based on specialized knowledge as required by Rule 702. Throughout the
report Mr. Hunt notes and describes his methodology in determining the origin and the cause of
the fire, and both entail his systemic evaluation of the structure and the process of elimination by
examining the remaining physical evidence, the patterns of fire and smoke damage and the witness
statements. Indeed, as set forth in detail in Appellant's opening brief, Mr. Hunt's evaluation of
the structure carefully details his process of elimination in determining the origin of the fire and
the cause of the fire. R., pp. 807-814. Thus, it is abundantly clear that both of Mr. Hunt's opinions
were based upon "a reasonable degree of fire science certainty." R., p. 814.
While Mr. Hunt's report does state that the cause of the fire is undetermined pending an
evaluation by an electrical engineer, he is referring to the specific cause within the dryer. R., p.
814. As set forth previously, experts who opine on probable cause in negligence actions are not
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required to set forth the specific cause or a specific ignition sequence; it is sufficient for them to
opine as to a reasonably likely cause, and fact witnesses or other experts, can fill in the details.
See Lantham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 492-93, 943 P.2d 912, 918-919 (1997) (fire

investigation expert's testimony as to several possible causes of fire on landowner's property was
not impermissibly speculative so as to preclude its admission in a negligence action); Nield v.
Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 14, (2012) (once medical experts have

opined in a negligence action as to the potential sources of an infection, it does not take expert
testimony to establish exactly how a particular person contracted a particular infection; fact
witnesses can provide the necessary details about sanitary conditions, contact by or with the
infected person, wound care received by the infected person, and the like in order to fill in the
details); and Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007)
(expert's testimony that infusion was a substantial factor in causing patient's death to a reasonable
medical probability, even though he was unable to determine the exact effect of the medication
on patient and was not certain whether the chemicals themselves, the volume of fluid, or the
combination of the two caused the death, it was based upon sound scientific principles and thus
was admissible in medical malpractice action).

Mr. Hunt employed his scientific methodology and process of elimination to opine that the
probable cause of the fire was the dryer. Contrary to the District Court's holding and Respondent's
arguments, he is not required to provided exactly how the fire was ignited, it is sufficient that he
provided a likely cause and witnesses and other experts can fill in the rest. Accordingly, the
District Court failed to apply the appropriate legal standard here and abused its discretion in
excluding Mr. Hunt's testimony on causation.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE

9

C.

The District Court inappropriately excluded David Cutbirth's expert
testimony on causation in that the court failed to recognize the scientific
methodology utilized in reaching the opinion and inappropriately substituted
its own judgment over that of a highly qualified expert.

Respondent argues that the District Court appropriately excluded Mr. Cutbirth's expert
testimony on causation. Respondent's Brief, p. 14. Respondent argues that Mr. Cutbirth was not
qualified to render an opinion that the fire originated in a PVC pipe attached to the vent hose, and
that his opinions were purely speculative. Id., pp. 14-18. However, Mr. Cutbirth's conclusions
are supported by his knowledge of electricity and the transformation of energy as an electrical
engineer, as well as the methodology he employed and outlined in his report. R., pp 794-799.
Accordingly, the District Court inappropriately excluded his testimony on causation.
1.

Mr. Cutbirth is a qualified expert.

"The test for determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert is 'not rigid' and can
be found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 702." Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho
834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007). Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
I.R.E. 702. Thus, a qualified expert is one who possesses "knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education." Id. The proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence showing that
the individual is qualified as an expert on the topic of his or her testimony. Weeks v. Eastern Idaho

Health Services, 143 Idaho at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183.
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In the present case, Mr. Cutbirth sets forth in his report that he is a principal electrical
engineer, with over twenty years experience, licensed in the State ofldaho since 1998. R., p. 794.
He further sets forth that he is president of DC Engineering, an organization that provides
consulting engineering services for commercial, industrial, and retail facilities. Id. In addition, he
states that he provides expert opinions on fire investigations that are initially determined to be
electrical in nature. Id. He then opines that it is his "professional opinion that the fire was not
caused by an electrical fault either within the drier or the wiring feeding the direr," but that "the
fire was caused by combustion within the drier vent, at or near the PVC piping [due to static
electricity]that was utilized as an extension of a 'short' pierce of drier venting to the outside wall
exhaust." R., p. 795.

Thus, because Mr. Cutbirth is a qualified expert on electricity and the

transformation of energy as an electrical engineer, he has met the test outlined in I.R.E. 702 to
establish him as an expert on the topics of his testimony.

2.

Mr. Cutbirth's opinions are admissible as they are supported by sound
principles and methodology.

The test for admissibility of expert testimony is also Rule 702. Weeks v. Eastern Idaho
Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 838, 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2007). "The question under the

evidence rule is simply whether the expert's knowledge will assist the trier of fact; not whether the
information upon which the expert's opinion is based is commonly agreed upon." Id., quoting
Merwin, 131 Idaho at 646, 962 P.2d at 1030. The specific study does not have to be universally

accepted in order for experts to validly use the study as a basis of opinion. Id. Instead, the focus
of the court's inquiry is on the "principles and methodology" used not the conclusions they
generate. Id.
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Mr. Cutbirth's declaration and report set forth the methodology and principles he
employed: i.e., his knowledge, his site visit/evaluation, his interview of Plaintiff, and the
International Mechanical Code. R. pp. 797-799. Mr. Cutbirth notes that PVC and/or other nonmetallic hard piped connections were utilized from the drier exhaust to the outside connections.
R., p. 798. He then explains that, pursuant to the International Mechanical Code Section 504.6.1,
exhaust ducts for driers are to be constructed of metal and that no exception was found in the Code
that allows for PVC or other non-metallic substances. R., pp. 795; 798. Mr. Cutbirth explains the
reasoning being that PVC's maximum operating temperature is 140 degrees, while dryer discharge
temperature may be as high as 155 degrees. Id. He further opines based on his knowledge as an
electrical engineer that PVC is prone for creating static electricity when moving air, which is also
likely to cause a buildup of lint. Id. These bases appropriately support his conclusion that the
probable cause of the fire was combustion in the drier vent.
As set forth above, experts who opine on probable cause in negligence actions are not
required to set forth the specific cause or a specific ignition sequence; it is sufficient for them to
opine as to a reasonably likely cause as long as such testimony is based on scientific principles and
methodology. See Lantham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 492-93, 943 P.2d 912, 918-919
(1997); Nield v. Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 724 (2012); and Weeks
v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007). The District Court abused

its discretion by failing to recognize the methodology employed here by Mr. Cutbirth and by
inappropriately substituting its own judgment over that of a qualified expert. R., pp. 897-900. As
set forth in detail in Appellant's opening brief, it is clear from reading the opinion that the District
Court had its own understanding of the scientific principles at issue and that the District Court was
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comparing the information provided by Mr. Cutbirth to the District Court's own understanding
and then determining if Mr. Cutbirth's opinions were valid. Id.
"[T]he admissibility stage is not subject to an adversarial process." Nield v. Pocatello Health
Services, Inc., 156 Idaho at 811, 332 P.3d at 723. "In other words, in determining whether an

expert's testimony is admissible, '[t]he Court must look at the affidavit or deposition testimony
and determine whether it alleges facts, which if taken as true, would render the testimony
admissible."' Id., quoting Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 871, 136 P.3d 338, 342 (2006). In
determining admissibility, the trial court must consider only the opinion testimony of the expert;
it is error for the trial court to base its determination solely on the grounds that the expert did not
counter the various possibilities suggested by an opposing expert, (or in this case the District
Court). Id. Here, the District Court did not consider only the opinion of Mr. Cutbirth, but the
District Court's own opinions as well, and then determined that Mr. Cutbirth did not answer all of
the District Court's questions and possibilities. Mr. Cutbirth's testimony that the fire was caused
by combustion within the dryer vent at or near the PVC piping was sufficient under Rule 702 as it
was supported by Mr. Cutbirth's expert knowledge of static electricity, his site evaluation,
interviews with witnesses and the International Mechanical Code.
Respondent's reliance on Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651 (2002),
is misplaced. Respondent erroneously contends that Carnell concludes that "electrical experts are
not fire origin experts." Respondent's Brief, p. 17. The case in no way makes such a broad
pronouncement. The Carnell court simply determined that in that particular case, the particular
affidavit of an electrician submitted as expert testimony on fire causation and origin was
insufficient, because it did not meet the threshold question of admissibility under Rule 702.
Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho at 328, 48 P.3d at 657. The electrician's affidavit lacked
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information concerning his education, training, and experience relating to the testimony he was
giving. Id. It further lacked testimony regarding the methodology used, factual foundation (he
claimed to have reviewed the depositions in the case, but his conclusions contradicted testimony
given in those cases), and did nothing more than make conclusions of law. Id. That is not the case
here. As set forth above, Mr. Cutbirth is an accomplished electrical engineer with over 20 years
of experience, and due to his expert knowledge of static electricity, his site evaluation, interviews
with witnesses and the International Mechanical Code is offering his expert onion that the fire was
caused by combustion within the dryer vent.
Accordingly, the District Court failed to apply the appropriate legal standard here and abused
its discretion in excluding Mr. Cutbirth's testimony on causation.
D.

Respondents attempts to distinguish Lantham, Nield and Weeks, misses the
mark and confuses the issue.

Respondent argues that Appellant cites to Lantham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486,
492-93, 943 P.2d 912, 918-919 (1997), Nield v. Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802,
332 P.3d 724 (2012) and Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180
(2007), to support the proposition that Appellant's experts are not required to establish causation.
Respondent misstates Appellant's argument. Appellant has never argued that its experts are not
required to establish causation.

To the contrary, Appellants contend that the District Court

erroneously excluded Appellant's expert testimony on causation. The above cases were cited by
Appellant to demonstrate that the testimony offered by its experts on causation was sufficient for
admissibility purposes.

In Lantham, supra, certain landowners brought a negligence action against Idaho Power
following a fire. Id., 130 Idaho 486, 943 P.2d 912. Specifically, the landowner's alleged that
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Idaho Power was negligent in its maintenance of a power line that ran across the landowners'
property, and such negligence was the probable cause of the fire. Id., 130 Idaho at 491, 943 P.2d
at 917. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Idaho Power, the landowners argued on appeal
that the trial court errored in the admission of Idaho Power's expert testimony that several causes
could have led to the fire and that lightening was the most likely cause of the fire. Id., 130 Idaho
at 491-492, 943 P.2d 917-918. This Court held that the fire investigation expert's testimony as to
several possible causes was not impermissibly speculative because of the process of elimination
used by fire investigators to determine the cause of a fire. Id., 130 Idaho at 492,943 P.2d 918. In
addition, this Court held that it was not necessary that the expert set forth a specific cause, but that
it was sufficient for the expert to opine as to a reasonably likely cause, and that fact witnesses or
other experts could fill in the details. Id., 130 Idaho at 492-493, 943 P.2d 918-919.

In Nield, supra, a patient brought action against a rehabilitation center alleging negligence
in providing her with wound care after her discharge from the hospital. Id., 156 Idaho 804-805,
332 P.3d 716-717. Specifically, she alleged that as a result of the defendant's care she contracted
the infectious disease MRSA. Id. The plaintiff offered expert testimony as to potential sources of
contracting the infection, as well as the probable source for her infection. On appeal, the patient
argued that the trial court erroneously struck her expert's affidavit and required that she "eliminate
any other cause and show that she could have only gotten MRSA ... from [defendant's facility]."
Id., 156 Idaho at 810, 332 P.3d at 722. This Court held that "once the experts have opined as to

the potential sources of an infection, it does not take expert testimony to establish exactly how a
particular person contacted a particular infection. Fact witnesses can provide the necessary details
about sanitary conditions, contact by or with the infected person, wound care received by the
infected person, would care received by the infected person, and like in order to fill in the details."
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Id., 156 Idaho at 812, 332 P.3d 724. Furthermore, "proximate cause can be shown from "a chain

of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally
inferable." Id. Thus, this Court determined that the trial court erred in determining that the expert's
affidavit was inadmissible because it did not eliminate every potential alternate source of the
plaintiffs infection. Id., 156 Idaho at 813, 332 P.3d 725.

In Weeks, supra, a patient's family brought a medical malpractice action against a medical
center after patient died allegedly due to mistake in attaching fluid mixture to catheter rather than
to intravenous line. Id., 143 Idaho 834, 836 153 P.3d 1180, 1182. The trial court ruled that
plaintiffs expert testimony was not admissible because it was not based upon sound scientific
principles. Id., 143 Idaho at 837-838, 153 P.3d at 1183-1184. This Court determined that the
expert's testimony that infusion was a substantial factor in causing the patient's death to a
reasonable medical probability, even though he was unable to determine the exact effect of the
medication on the patient and was not certain whether the chemicals themselves, the volume of
fluid, or the combination of the two caused the death, it was based upon sound scientific principles
[experience and research] and thus was admissible in medical malpractice action. Id., 143 Idaho
at 839, 153 P.3d at 1185.

The above cases demonstrate that experts who opine on probable cause in negligence
actions are not required to set forth the specific cause, or in this case, the specific ignition sequence.
It is sufficient for experts to opine as to a reasonably likely cause, (as long as based on sound
principles), and fact witnesses or other experts can fill in the details. Here, as set forth above and
in Appellant's opening brief, Mr. Hunt testified that the probable cause of the fire was the dryer
that had been left running. R., p. 814. Mr. Hunt's report notes and describe his methodology in

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 16

reaching this conclusion, specifically his evaluation of the structure and his use of the process of
elimination. While he does not specifically opine on the ignition sequence within the dryer, and
leaves such to Mr. Cutbirth and other fact witnesses, such is allowable as demonstrated by the
above cases. Thus, because Mr. Hunt's opinion is that the dryer was the probable cause, and his
opinion is supported by sound principles, the District Court abused its discretion in excluding it.

Mr. Cutbirth's report provides that the fire was caused by combustion within the dryer vent
at or near the PVC piping. His report notes and describes his methodology in reaching his
conclusion, namely his expert knowledge of static electricity, his site evaluation, interviews with
witnesses and International Mechanical Code.

While he may not opine on specifically how

ignition occurred, his report is sufficient as it provides a reasonable cause and is supported by
sound principles. Thus, the District Court abused its discretion in excluding Mr. Cutbirth's
testimony on causation.
II.

The District Court erred in granting summary judgment and concluding that no
rational juror could conclude that Respondent's negligence caused the fire.

Respondent argues that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment because
"[Appellant] did not rebut the assertion that the fire was not caused by [Respondent]."
Respondent's Brief, p. 26.

In addition, Respondent argues that there is no evidence that

Respondent acted improperly in operating the dryer. Id., at pp. 26-27. However, as set forth in
Appellant's opening brief, Appellant set forth more than sufficient evidence of causation that
Respondent's negligent installation and maintenance of the dryer cause the fire and Appellant's
damage.
Again, Appellant set forth evidence through declarations, expert reports and deposition
testimony that Respondent's negligent installation and maintenance of the dryer caused the fire.
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To begin with, Jeremy Haile testified during his deposition that the dryer was hooked up in a makeshift and unorthodox manner in that they used a piece of PVC (poly vinyl chloride) pipe to attach
the dryer to the west wall.

R., pp. 671:12-673:12. The PVC pipe was inserted into the dryer's

flexible aluminum dryer vent, which funnels out the dryer's hot air, and was attached to the wall
that led to the exterior. Id. Mr. Haile testified that they bought the dryer used and since its purchase
they had not serviced or repaired the dryer, nor had they ever taken off the back and cleaned out
the lint. R., p. 679:2-6. He further testified that on the night of the fire, August 11, 2017, his last
employee to leave the building left a load of laundry running in the washing machine and clothes
dryer. R., pp. 618:9-619.
Plaintiff then provided the expert report and declaration of Dean Hunt. Mr. Hunt is a fire
consultant with over 30 years' experience in fire service and 19 years as a fire investigator and
Fire Marshall. R. p. 736. Mr. Hunt determined that the fire originated in the laundry room and
that the probable cause of the fire was the dryer in the laundry room that had been left running
prior to the fire. R., p. 814. Mr. Hunt's conclusions were supported by his knowledge of fire
science and the methodology he employed and outlined in his report, specifically his examination
of the fire scene and interviews with witnesses. R., pp. 805-814. His evaluation of the structure
detailed his process of elimination in determining the origin of the fire and the cause of the fire.

Id. Mr. Hunt stated that there were bum patterns on the dryer that extended from the rear bottom
comer upward toward the front of the dryer. R., p. 812. The interior of the dryer was damaged
from heat and flame. Id. The burned remains of fabric were inside the drum. Id. The insulation
of the electrical cord that was plugged into the outlet at the south wall had been consumed by the
fire from where the cord attached to the dryer and dropped down the back of the dryer to the floor.

Id. A flexible dryer vent duct was lying on floor separated from the dryer. Id. There was a hole
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melted in the aluminum duct 3 feet from the dryer connection. Id. Mr. Hunt then noted that prior
to the fire, this duct was attached at the west wall to a piece of Poly Vinyl Choride (PVC) pipe that
led to the exterior and the PVC pipe had been consumed by fire. Id. In addition, Mr. Hunt noted
that the dryer was old, no service or repairs had been done to the dryer since its purchase and the
back of the dryer had never been removed to clean lint from it. Id.
Appellant also provided the expert report and declaration of David Cutbirth. As provided
above, Mr. Cutbirth is a principal electrical engineer licensed in the state of Idaho with over 21
years of experience. R., p. 794. Mr. Cutbirth opined that it was his "professional opinion that the
fire was not caused by an electrical fault either within the drier or the wiring feeding the drier,"
but that "the fire was caused by combustion within the drier vent, at or near the PVC piping that
was utilized as an extension of a 'short' piece of drier venting to the outside wall exhaust." R., p
795.

Mr. Cutbirth's conclusions were supported by his knowledge of electricity and the

transformation of energy as an electrical engineer, as well as the methodology he employed and
outlined in his report. R., pp. 794-799. Mr. Cutbirth explained that pursuant to the International
Mechanical Code Section 504.6.1, exhaust ducts for driers are to be construed of metal, not PVC
or some other non-metallic substances. R., pp. 795; 798. Mr. Cutbirth explained the reasoning
being that PVC's maximum operating temperature is 140 degrees, while dryer discharge
temperature may be as high as 155 degrees. Id. He further opined based on his knowledge as an
electrical engineer that PVC is prone for creating static electricity when moving air, which is also
likely to cause a buildup of lint.

Id. These bases appropriately support his conclusion that the

probable cause of the fire was combustion in the drier vent.
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Thus, because the record contained conflicting evidence regarding causation, the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment and in concluding that no rational juror could conclude
that Respondent's negligence caused the fire.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and Appellant's opening brief, Appellant Tech Landing, LLC,
respectfully requests that the Court: (1) Reverse the District Court's decision to exclude the
testimony from Appellant's two expert witnesses regarding causation in opposition to
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Reverse the District Court's decision granting
summary judgment on Appellant's negligence claim; and (3) Remand the case to the District Court
for trial on Appellant's negligence claim.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24 th day of December, 2019.
SASSER & JACOBSON, PLLC

By: /s/ James F. Jacobson
James F. Jacobson
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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